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WELFARE LAW-AFDC-Agency-Caused Overpayments May
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regarded" Income Available to Meet Their Standard of Need.
McGraw v. Berger, 75 Civ. 4682 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 1976), appeal
docketed, No. 76-7102, 2d Cir., Mar. 5, 1976.
A woman and her nine dependent children, recipients of semi-
monthly benefits under the program for Aid to Families with Depen-
dent Children (AFDC) in New York, I received overpayments caused
by welfare agency error.' The agency attempted to recoup the over-
payments by reducing the family's AFDC grant,' in accordance with
a state regulation which authorized such recoupment where a wel-
fare recipient had current income available in excess of the AFDC
grant.4 The woman made an unsuccessful challenge at an adminis-
trative hearing and then instituted an action for injunctive and
declaratory relief in the Federal District Court for the Southern
District of New York.5 She claimed that the state's recoupment
policy violated federal law and denied her due process and equal
protection under the United States Constitution.'
The court held that the challenged recoupment policy did not
violate the Social Security Act, and it left the constitutional chal-
lenges to the determination of a three-judge court.'
A state participating in the AFDC program must furnish aid to
1. Aid to Families with Dependent Children, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-44 (1970), as amended,
(Supp. IV, 1974) [hereinafter cited as AFDC], is one of the categorical public assistance
programs established by the Social Security Act of 1935. It is supported by the federal
government on a matching fund basis, and is administered by the states. Those states wishing
to participate must submit plans, for approval by the Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare (HEW), which conform to the requirements of AFDC and the regulations of HEW.
Williams v. Wohlgemuth, 400 F. Supp. 1309, 1316 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
2. The cause of the agency's error is not disclosed in the court's opinion. Agency error may
result from computing errors within the agency. Often, a non-willful failure by the applicant
to furnish complete information, leading to an incorrect budget calculation, will be labeled
"agency error." Defendant's Memorandum of Law at 22, McGraw v. Berger, 75 Civ. 4682
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 1976), appeal docketed, No. 76-7102, 2d Cir., Mar. 5, 1976.
3. 75 Civ. 4682, at 7-8.
4. 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 352.31(d)(1)(ii) (1975). Income "disregarded" by the agency (as a work
incentive) when determining eligibility for AFDC is considered to be currently available
income for purposes of recoupment. Id.
5. Federal courts may review state welfare regulations before HEW has ruled on their
validity. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
6. 75 Civ. 4682, at 2-3.
7. Id. at 18.
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dependent children' "as far as practicable under the conditions in
such State . . . . " The state must test applicants for eligibility
under two federal prerequisites-need and dependency. A two-step
procedure is carried out.
First, the state measures eligibility by "determining need."'" It
fixes a standard of need, "a yardstick for measuring who is eligible
for public assistance,"' 2 which represents the minimum subsistence
level for families in the state.
In determining eligibility, the state must take into consideration
only the income and resources actually available to the needy child
and those persons who support him. 3 The state may not assume
that aid will come from those not legally obligated to support the
welfare child." An applicant's available income is compared with
the standard of need." If the income falls below the standard of
need, he is eligible for AFDC."6 As part of the aforementioned com-
parison, the state must disregard a specified amount of the appli-
cant's earned income"? in furtherance of congressional work-
incentive policies.
Second, the state determines how much assistance will be given.
The amount of the assistance payment is "based upon"' 9 the differ-
ence between the applicant's available (non-disregarded) income
and the state's standard of need." However, it need not equal 100
8. The term "dependent child" is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970).
9. Id. § 601 (1970).
10. Holloway v. Parham, 340 F. Supp. 336, 342 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (Supp. IV, 1974).
12. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 408 (1970). The New York standard of need is
established in N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 131-a (McKinney 1976). A state's standard of need is
not necessarily reflective of actual need. County of Alameda v. Carleson, 5 Cal. 3d 730, 746
n.18, 488 P.2d 953, 964 n.18, 97 Cal. Rptr. 385, 396 n.18 (1971), appeal dismissed, 406 U.S.
913 (1972).
13. See text accompanying notes 15-18 infra.
14. See Van Lare v. Hurley, 421 U.S. 338 (1975) (presumed income from "lodger" in
household); Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970) (presumed income from "adult male person
assuming role of spouse"); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (presumed income from
"substitute father" not legally obligated to support child).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (Supp. IV, 1974).
16. Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251, 253-54 (1974).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8) (Supp. IV, 1974).
18. See text accompanying notes 47-49 infra.
19. Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251, 254 (1974).
20. This differential has been called the "budget deficit" in the subject case. McGraw v.
Berger, 75 Civ. 4682, at 6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 1976), appeal docketed, No. 76-7102, 2d Cir.,
Mar. 5, 1976.
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percent of that differential," as each state is free "to determine the
level of benefits by the amount of funds it devotes to the program."
Title IV of the Social Security Act, 3 which establishes the pro-
gram for aid to needy families with children, contains no provision
directing participating states to recoup overpayments. 4 However,
recoupment has been authorized in the regulations issued by the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW).5 Such re-
coupment may be effected only if "the recipient has income or re-
sources exclusive of the current assistance payment currently avail-
able in the amount by which the agency proposes to reduce
payments . "2... ,
21. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
22. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 318-19 (1968).
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-44 (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974).
24. But cf. 42 U.S.C. § 404 (1970); id. § 1383(b) (Supp. IV, 1974). Federal recovery of Old-
Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) overpayments is expressly authorized in
42 U.S.C. § 404 (1970). Federal recovery of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) overpay-
ments is expressly authorized in 42 U.S.C. § 1383(b) (Supp. IV, 1974). However, both
provisions proscribe recovery from a person without fault if such recovery would defeat the
purposes of the program or be against equity and good conscience. The Social Security Act
does entitle the federal government to a pro rata share of amounts recovered by those states
which do provide for recoupment. 42 U.S.C. § 603(b)(2)(B) (1970).
25. The regulations deal only with involuntary recoupment of overpayments. Hagans v.
Wyman, 399 F. Supp. 421, 424 (E.D.N.Y.), vacated as moot, 527 F.2d 1151 (2d Cir. 1975). In
Hagans, the court struck down a New York regulation which permitted recoupment (from
subsequent grants) of an advance allowance made to an AFDC recipient to prevent eviction
for non-payment of rent. Id. at 425. While the case proceeded through appellate review and
remand in connection with jurisdictional issues, Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974), the
regulation was revised to require written consent to recoupment. 399 F. Supp. at 423. The
district court, on the most recent remand, held the regulation invalid, id. at 425, in part
because such a consent, although "knowing," was unlikely to be voluntary in view of the
recipient's only alternatives: consent-to-recoupment or eviction. Id. at 423. The court of
appeals vacated this holding on mootness grounds in that the amended procedure calling for
written consent to recoupment did not retroactively apply to plaintiff. 527 F.2d at 1153-54.
26. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(12)(i)(A)(1) (1975) (emphasis added). Where the recipient has
made willful misstatements concerning his income or resources, or willfully failed to report
changes in his income which may affect the amount of his AFDC grant, recoupment of
overpayments by reduction of AFDC grants may be carried out whether or not the recipient
has income available aside from his AFDC grant. Id. §§ 233.20(a)(12)(i)(A)(2), (B)(1)-(2).
However, the state must limit deductions from current assistance payments "so as not to
cause undue hardship or [sic) recipients." Id. § 233.20(f). In Jacquet v. Bonin, 72 Civ. 2589
(E.D. La. July 21, 1975), appeal docketed, No. 75-3828, 5th Cir., Oct. 23, 1975, the court
refused to enjoin recoupment (by grant reduction) of an overpayment caused by willful failure
of the recipient to report income. At the time of recoupment, the recipient had no income
available other than the AFDC grant. Accord, Lomax v. Lavine, 72 Civ. 2457 (S.D.N.Y. July
31, 1972). But see Brown v. Wohlgemuth, 371 F. Supp. 1035, 1039 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 492 F.2d
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A state may elect not to recoup overpayments,27 but it must main-
tain a quality control system2 and suffer a reduction in federal
financial participation when AFDC overpayments exceed a speci-
fied percentage-level.29 Under certain conditions, states may resort
to civil actions to recover overpayments of assistance.'"
The paramount goal of the AFDC program has traditionally been
viewed as the protection of the needy, dependent child." Courts
have been hostile to the imposition of additional conditions, under
state AFDC plans, which have effected reductions or denials of aid
to needy children.3" Recoupment policies which punish an innocent,
needy child for the errors of others have been found to conflict with
the paramount goal of AFDC.33
1238 (3d Cir. 1974) (state cannot withhold AFDC grants to recoup prior duplicate assistance
payments even where recipient has fraudulently acquired the duplicate payment).
27. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(h) (1975).
28. Id. § 205.40.
29. Id. § 205.41(c).
30. A state court has held that welfare agencies may bring civil suits in assumpsit, for
money had and received, to recover overpayments of assistance, except where overpayments
result from administrative error. Redding v. Burlington County Welfare Bd., 65 N.J. 439, 445-
47, 323 A.2d 477, 480-81 (1974). See also Webb v. Swoap, 40 Cal. App. 3d 191, 114 Cal. Rptr.
897 (1974) (public welfare recipients are free of liability for repayment of grants legitimately
obtained in absence of a statute imposing liability). See generally Mount Sinai Hosp. v.
Weinberger, 517 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3593 (U.S. April 20, 1976)
(government has inherent authority to recover sums erroneously paid, but Congress may
delimit when and from whom such recoupment may be obtained).
31. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 325 (1968).
32. See Van Lare v. Hurley, 421 U.S. 338 (1975) (preventing ineligible lodgers from receiv-
ing welfare benefits); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (discouraging influx of poor
people); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (discouraging immorality); Hagans v. Wyman,
399 F. Supp. 421 (E.D.N.Y.), vacated as moot, 527 F.2d 1151 (2d Cir. 1975) (teaching proper
management of funds); Doe v. Hursh, 337 F. Supp. 614 (D. Minn. 1970) (administrative
convenience). But see New York Dep't of Social Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973) (partici-
pation in state work incentive program a valid condition for receipt of benefits); Wyman v.
James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (acceptance of home visits by social worker a valid condition for
receipt of benefits).
45 C.F.R. § 233.10(a)(1) (1975) directs participating states to impose each condition of
eligibility required by the Social Security Act. States may impose conditions on applicants
for and recipients of public assistance which, if not satisfied, result in the denial or termina-
tion of public assistance. Stch conditions must assist the state in the efficient administration
of its public assistance programs, or further an independent state welfare policy, but cannot
be inconsistent with the provisions and purposes of the Social Security Act. Id. §
233.10(a)(1)(ii)(B).
33. See Bradford v. Juras, 331 F. Supp. 167 (D. Ore. 1971); Cooper v. Laupheimer, 316
F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Dunn v. Bates, 50 App. Div. 2d 561 (2d Dep't 1975); Gonzalez
v. Lavine, 46 App. Div. 2d 675, 359 N.Y.S.2d 908 (2d Dep't 1974).
CASE NOTES
In striking down earlier federal recoupment regulations, a federal
court enjoined HEW from promulgating recoupment regulations
which violated the principle of "in-fact availability of income and
resources."34 A presumption that overpayments are still on hand to
satisfy current needs is unreasonable. 5
Although entitlement to eligibility for AFDC does not confer enti-
tlement to the actual receipt of a given level of benefits, 3 a recipi-
ent's level of benefits should be maintained until his economic situ-
ation improves. One court has held that without an indication of
decreased need, "payments to eligible children may not be reduced
for purposes of recouping excess grants . . ,,"I As long as the
recipient remains eligible under the state's initial determination of
need, reduction of his grant is unwarranted.38 In view of the statu-
tory mandate to furnish aid "with reasonable promptness to all
eligible individuals, ' 39 a qualified recipient should not be denied
benefits "even temporarily"4 ° by a reduction of his grant without a
prior re-determination of need.
On the other hand, there is no entitlement to funds comprising
the overpayment.' It is reasonable for the state "to assure that
limited state welfare funds be spent on behalf of those genuinely
incapacitated and most in need"42 by recovering overpayments from
34. National Welfare Rights Organization v. Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 861, 869 (D.D.C.
1974). The court stated that its holding should not be construed to prohibit by regulation the
recoupment from current grants of prior overpayments caused by a recipient's willful with-
holding of information concerning his income and resources. Id. at 869. Tennessee's AFDC
regulations violating this principle were struck down in Caruthers v. Friend, No. 74-1821 (6th
Cir. Feb. 28, 1975). The current regulation requires in-fact availability. See text accompany-
ing note 26 supra.
35. Cooper v. Laupheimer, 316 F. Supp. 264, 269 (E.D. Pa. 1970). Recovery of overpay-
ments resulting from administrative error, of which the recipient had no knowledge, is unfair
since the extra funds could easily have been unwittingly dissipated. Adkin v. Berger, 50 App.
Div. 2d 459, 461, 378 N.Y.S.2d 135, 137 (3d Dep't 1976).
36. Jacquet v. Bonin, 72 Civ. 2589, at 9 (E.D. La. July 21, 1975), appeal docketed, No.
75-3828, 5th Cir., Oct. 23, 1975. See King v. Smith, 293 U.S. 309, 334 (1968) (state has
undisputed power to set the level of benefits).
37. Gonzalez v. Lavine, 46 App. Div. 2d 675, 359 N.Y.S.2d 908, 909 (2d Dep't 1974).
38. See Holloway v. Parham, 340 F. Supp. 336 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
39. 42 U.S.C § 602(a)(10) (Supp. IV. 1974).
40. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 545 (1972).
41. McGraw v. Berger, 75 Civ. 4682, at 8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 1976), appeal docketed, No.
76-7102, 2d Cir., Mar. 5, 1976.
42. New York Dep't of Social Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973).
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those persons with independent resources and redirecting the funds
to those persons with greater needs.43
In contrast with the cases discussed above, the challenged recoup-
ment in McGraw v. Berger44 was not made either from overpay-
ments presumably still in the recipient's hands, or from a recipient
whose only source of income was her semi-monthly AFDC grant. It
was made from a recipient who had earned income from employ-
ment.45 In accordance with federal work-incentive policies, a portion
of her earnings had been disregarded by the state when it deter-
mined her eligibility for AFDC.4"
Congress had encouraged AFDC recipients to seek income apart
from the assistance payments, by making the income-disregard47 a
mandatory feature of state AFDC plans in the Social Security
Amendments of 1967.48 Congress also created programs for
education and training of welfare recipients, and established child-
care to encourage AFDC parents to take advantage of work pro-
grams.4"
In making the determination of eligibility (need) prescribed by
section 602(a)(7) of the AFDC, 0 the welfare agency is to consider the
client's currently available income and resources only "after all poli-
43. State welfare regulations must be rationally-based and free of invidious discrimina-
tion to survive equal protection challenges. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
44. 75 Civ. 4682 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 1976), appeal docketed, No. 76-7102, 2d Cir., Mar.
5, 1976.
45. Id. at 5.
46. Id. at 6. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (Supp. IV, 1974) provides, in pertinent part:
A State plan for aid and services to needy families with children must .. .provide
that the State agency shall, in determining need, take into consideration any other
income and resources of any child or relative claiming aid ....
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(ii) (Supp. IV, 1974) provides, in pertinent part:
[Tjhe state agency shall with respect to any month disregard .. .in the case of
earned income . . . the first $30 of the total of such earned income for such month plus
one-third of the remainder of such income for such month ....
47. The disregard provisions do not apply to income earned in certain kinds of public
training and public service employment programs. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(A)(ii) (Supp. IV,
1974). See Betts v. Weinberger, 391 F. Supp. 1122, 1125 (D. Vt.), aff'd sub nom. Betts v.
Matthews, 96 S. Ct. 388 (1975).
48. Act of Jan. 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-248, 81 Stat. 821. "If all the earnings of a needy
person are deducted from his assistance payment, he has no gain for his effort." S. REP. No.
744, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1967), quoted in X v. McCorkle, 333 F. Supp. 1109, 1116 (D.N.J.
1970), modified sub noma. Engelman v. Amos, 404 U.S. 23 (1971).
49. X v. McCorkle, 333 F. Supp. 1109, 1115-16 (D.N.J. 1970), modified sub nom. Engel-
man v. Amos, 404 U.S. 23 (1971).
50. See note 46 supra.
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cies governing . . . disregard or setting aside of income . . .have
been uniformly applied." 5' Accordingly, if the act of recoupment
involves a "determination of need" under section 602(a)(7), then the
agency must apply the disregard policy in carrying out recoup-
ments. It could not look to disregarded income as a fund from which
recoupments might be made.
In McGraw the welfare agency followed the disregard policy
when it compared plaintiff's available income with the state's stan-
dard of need and found her eligible for AFDC.12 Subsequently, upon
realization that there had been agency-caused overpayments, the
agency determined that the recipient had, for recoupment purposes,
currently available income exclusive of the assistance grant.53 The
recipient was still eligible for AFDC grants,"4 but the agency claimed
a right to a limited recoupment therefrom.55 Such a recoupment
would not invade the recipient's basic standard of need,5" because
the disregarded income could replace the monies withheld from the
AFDC grant.
51. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii) (1975) (emphasis added). In Williams v. Lavine, 77 Misc.
2d 566, 353 N.Y.S.2d 340 (Sup. Ct. 1974), a welfare agency was prohibited from considering
work-incentive income of an AFDC recipient in determining her need for a discretionary
excess-shelter allowance. The court said this income cannot be "counted twice," in determin-
ing an applicant's ordinary needs and then her excess-shelter needs, because it has been "used
up" in meeting ordinary needs. Id. at 571, 353 N.Y.S.2d at 345. The McGraw court viewed
Williams as a mere reaffirmance of the principle that income-disregard "must be honored"
in determining an AFDC recipient's need. 75 Civ. 4682, at n.3.
52. 75 Civ. 4682, at 6.
53. Id. at 7. The New York regulation upheld in McGraw considers disregarded income
as being currently available income exclusive of the current assistance payment. 18
N.Y.C.R.R. § 352.31(d)(1)(ii) (1975). A state court has held it to be in conformity with federal
law and regulations. De Luca v. D'Elia, 83 Misc. 2d 1080, 374 N.Y.S.2d 92 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
The McGraw court gave little weight to De Luca as the latter was largely conclusory. 75 Civ.
4682, at a n.3. Earlier federal regulations treated disregarded income as available income for
recoupment purposes without qualification as to the cause of the overpayment. 38 Fed. Reg.
22010 (1973). A current federal regulation treats disregarded income as available income out
of which there may be recoupment of overpayments due to willful recipient misconduct. 45
C.F.R. § 233.20(f) (1975). It is silent as to whether disregarded income is available for recoup-
ment of overpayments due to agency error.
54. AFDC benefits "may not be terminated without a determination of ineligibility unless
an agency is unable to evaluate eligibility by reason of the recipient's refusal to cooper-
ate .... " Norton v. Lavine, 74 Misc. 2d 590, 597, 344 N.Y.S.2d 81, 89 (Sup. Ct. 1973)
(emphasis added).
55. 75 Civ. 4682, at 7-8.
56. Id. at 8.
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The McGraw court held that disregarded income was not pro-
tected against recoupment of agency-caused overpayments. 7 The
disregard mandate applied only to the initial determination of need
under section 602(a)(7),55 and not to later determinations in which
the actual amount of the grant is derived," because the grant is "a
function not only of the recipient's need, but also of the administra-
tive imperatives that may be dictated by a state's limited fiscal
resources."60 The court felt that Congress had not expressed an in-
tent to shield disregard income "under all circumstances and
against every State exigency."'" The court noted that HEW sup-
ported the challenged practice, a view conceded by plaintiff.2
Prior to the decision in McGraw, a federal court in Minnesota, in
Johnson v. Likins,63 had enjoined a welfare agency from recouping
agency-caused overpayments by reducing AFDC grants in amounts
up to one-half the disregarded income of the recipients. 4 The case
treated a fact pattern substantially the same as that in McGraw.
The McGraw court noted that ordinarily the authority of Johnson
would have been persuasive.65 However, it considered "Johnson's
precedential value [to be] seriously undermined by the clearly
erroneous premises on which the Johnson court rested its deci-
sion. "6
To the Johnson court, the concept of "need" seemed "central to
every aspect of the AFDC program."" Accordingly, the determina-
tion to recoup involved an inherent determination of need. The
Johnson court found a congressional intent that the disregard man-
date be observed whenever an agency determined need, or made
57. Id. at 17.
58. The state must apply the disregard policy "in determining whether a particular family
qualifies for aid." County of Alameda v. Carleson, 5 Cal. 3d 730, 739, 488 P.2d 953, 959, 97
Cal. Rptr. 385, 391 (1971), appeal dismissed, 406 U.S. 913 (1972) (emphasis added).
59. 75 Civ. 4682, at 14-15.
60. Id. at 14.
61. Id. at 16.
62. Id. at 11.
63. 4-75-Civ. 318 (D. Minn. Oct. 10, 1975).
64. Id. at 39.
65. 75 Civ. 4682, at 13.
66. Id. (emphasis added).
67. 4-75-Civ. 318, at 29.
68. Id. at 32; cf. Holloway v. Parham, 340 F. Supp. 336, 343 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
69. 4-75-Civ. 318, at 31.
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an assistance payment."0 However, McGraw read the "determina-
tion of need" concept more narrowly. The income-disregard was to
be observed only when the section 602(a)(7) test was carried out
to discover an applicant's budget deficit and qualify her for AFDC.
McGraw concluded the Johnson court had failed to discern the pro-
per "relation between the budget deficit and the ultimate AFDC
grant."" Even though the two may be equivalent in amount, as was
the case both in New York and Minnesota, they are not "function-
ally identical."" The budget deficit represents the maximum allow-
able AFDC grant; in consideration of its available financial re-
sources, the state may award a grant amounting to less than 100
percent of the budget deficit. 3
The McGraw court reasoned that Johnson "read into [the disre-
gard provisions] more than Congress said or intended." 4 Although
a portion of earned income would be disregarded in determining
eligibility, it was not to be ignored when recoupment was carried
out. 5 The agency's action in such a case was not a "determination
of need" under section 602(a)(7).7 6
The HEW regulations are ambiguous as to whether disregarded
income is considered to be currently available income exclusive of
the current assistance grant for purposes of recouping agency-
caused overpayments. The Johnson court concluded that "HEW
would appear not to allow recoupments from disregard income in
cases of agency error or non-willful recipient error. 71 8 The plaintiff
70. Id. at 29.
71. 75 Civ. 4682, at 14.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. "The proportion of the current assistance grant that may be deducted for recoupment
purposes shall be limited on a case-by-case basis so as not to cause undue hardship, and in
no case shall exceed 10 percent of the household needs . 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 352.31(d)(4)
(1975).
76. Cf. County of Alameda v. Carleson, 5 Cal. 3d 730, 742 n.14, 488 P.2d 953, 961 n.14,
97 Cal. Rptr. 385, 393 n.14 (1971), appeal dismissed, 406 U.S. 913 (1972) (error to equate the
term "needs" with the "standard of need" established by the state, as the Social Security
Act distinguishes between the general concept of "needs" and the administratively-fixed
"need as determined by the State agency").
77. See note 53 supra.
78. 4-75-Civ. 318, at 35 (emphasis added). The court referred to an amicus curiae brief of
HEW in Hagans v. Wyman, 399 F. Supp. 421 (E.D.N.Y.), vacated as moot, 527 F.2d 1151
(2d Cir. 1975), which seemed "to treat disregard income as non-exclusive of the current
19761
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
in McGraw represented to the court that "consultation between
attorneys for the [National Welfare Rights Organization] and
HEW indicated that HEW allow[s] the [recoupment] practice
challenged herein."7 Thus, the McGraw court found that HEW's
actual position permitting recoupment from disregarded income
contradicted the Johnson court's conclusion.'"
The Johnson court decided, upon its reading of congressional in-
tent, that "the income disregard work incentive is absolutely essen-
tial to the total AFDC program,"'" and that the policy of encourag-
ing employment of AFDC parents was now of equal force with the
policy of aiding needy children." McGraw found no intent to shield
disregarded income under all circumstances 3 once it had influenced
the determination of eligibility. The challenged recoupment in-
vaded disregarded income for a limited period of time while it ac-
complished the valid objectives of recovering overpayments and
promoting a fair apportionment of limited AFDC funds. 4 Thus,
"there is no destruction of the work incentive, but only a temporary
diminution or suspension thereof, and thus no thwarting of congres-
sional intent."8 5
As McGraw points out," Johnson's holding was influenced by the
belief that income-disregard may be a disguised supplement to
assistance grant and as non-currently available income and resources." 4-75-Civ. 318, at
34-35. The court did not refer to the federql regulation which treats disregarded income as
available income out of which there may be recoupment of overpayments due to willful
recipient misconduct. See note 53 supra.
In Bradford v. Juras, 331 F. Supp. 167 (D. Ore. 1971), it was said that "federal regulations
treat cash reserves and income disregards as separate and distinct from the welfare grant."
Id. at 169 (emphasis added). The holding in Bradford, which approved recoupment from
disregarded income, was distinguished away by both the Johnson and McGraw courts because
it erroneously presumed that the income-disregard policy was discretionary. 4-75-Civ. 318,
at 26; 75 Civ. 4682, at n.3.
79. Plaintiffs Supplementary Brief at 11, McGraw v. Berger, 75 Civ, 4682 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
25, 1976), appeal docketed, No. 76-7102, 2d Cir., Mar. 5, 1976.
80. 75 Civ. 4682, at 13.
81. 4-75-Civ. 318, at 32.
82. Id. at 31.
83. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
84. 75 Civ. 4682, at 17.
85. Id. Johnson viewed the recipients of disregard income as "those who have demon-
strated the ability and initiative to obtain employment while raising a family." 4-75-Civ. 318,
at 46 n.25. It should not be assumed that such persons will have their incentive destroyed so
completely by a temporary setback.
86. 75 Civ. 4682, at a n.5.
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AFDC families in states (unlike Minnesota and New York) which
pay less than 100 percent of the standard of need.87 The McGraw
court limited its analysis to the case at hand:8 recoupment by a
state paying 100 percent of the standard of need.
McGraw's careful reading of the statute, in the process of uphold-
ing the challenged recoupment, gives greater weight to the factors
other than recipient need which ultimately must affect the amount
paid out in benefits. The current heightened awareness that there
are limits to state resources 9 has resulted in the tightening and
curtailment of welfare programs. Welfare agencies must make
greater efforts to decrease errors which produce overpayments;'" but
because much "agency error" is recipient-generated, 9' there is a
need for an equitable means of recovering overpayments from those
who have supplemental resources.
Keith E. Danish
87. 4-75-Civ. 318, at 37.
88. 75 Civ. 4682, at 17. In its speculation about conditions in the poorer states, the
Johnson court did not mention that other programs, such as food stamps, might bring AFDC
families up to the standard of subsistence.
89. "Congress was itself cognizant of the limitations on state resources from the very
outset of the federal welfare program." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 478 (1970).
90. See text accompanying notes 28-29 supra.
91. See note 2 supra.
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